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Quasi-partnerships, acquiescence, excessive remuneration and discounts 
on buy-outs: case law developments in the law relating to section 994 
Several theoretical and practical issues in relation to the interpretation and 
application of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 were considered in two High 
Court cases in early 2019.1  
The issues covered included:  
 The nature, duration and effect of ‘quasi-partnership’ relationships  
 The effect of delay, knowledge, acquiescence and consent  
 Excessive remuneration and the payment of dividends 
 Discounts on the purchase of minority holdings  
A wide range of other matters of more general company law interest were also 
discussed, including the law relating to corporate opportunities and the rights of 
access of individual directors to corporate information. 
This article considers the coverage of the above issues in these two cases.  
The relevant facts 
As in many section 994 cases, the facts in both Re AMT Coffee Limited and Re 
Westshield Limited, particularly the latter, were detailed and complicated, 
encompassing events that had occurred over more than 20 and 40 years 
respectively.  
Re AMT Coffee  
AMT Coffee Limited is a family owned company that operates numerous retail 
coffee shops in the UK, including several at mainline railway stations. Its business 
began life as a partnership between three brothers. The business was incorporated 
in 1993, when the three brothers and their father (who was succeeded after his 
death by their mother) became equal shareholders and directors. At incorporation, 
it was therefore a ‘classic’ example of a quasi-partnership company. 
Throughout the company’s existence up to the date of the trial, there had been 
continual strong disagreements about how to run the company. The eldest of the 
three brothers had died in 2006. It was his surviving spouse, together with his 
other personal representative, who had brought the petition. Their complaints 
were: 
“… in essence threefold. First, the directors paid themselves excessive 
remuneration. Second, the Company failed to give consideration in good faith to 
                                                            




the payment of dividends despite its accumulated profit and loss account. Thirdly, 
the directors benefited from loans from the Company at favourable rates.”2 
Re Westshield  
Westshield Limited was an engineering and construction company that was 
incorporated in 1977 by the parents of the four siblings involved in the case. Each 
parent owned 50% of the shares. Over the course of 30 years, the shareholdings 
had altered as the children’s involvement with the company increased. By 2007, 
the respondent, Patrick Waldron (“P”), and his father each owned 30% of the 
shares in the company and P had been appointed as managing director of the 
company.  Mrs Waldron, the mother, and the three remaining children (“A”, “G” 
and “M”), who were the petitioners, each owned 10% of the shares. A had also 
been appointed as a director of the company, G had been appointed as Company 
secretary. M held no office but had been employed by the company between 1997 
and 2005.  
Following the ‘credit crunch’ in 2008, the company experienced serious difficulties. 
In order to retain its banking facilities, and after acrimonious negotiations between 
the siblings, the shareholdings were further varied and the company’s bank 
acquired a significant shareholding. At this point, P owned roughly 35% of the 
shares, A and G each held roughly 18%, M held 8% and the bank held 20%. 
Financial problems continued, however, and in 2010 the company entered a 
Company Voluntary Arrangement, which lasted until 2015.  
In 2014, in order to acquire some contracts from a company that had gone into 
administration, P formed a separate company (“Tunnelling”) of which he was the 
sole director and shareholder. Having obtained the contracts, Tunnelling then 
exploited them in a way that benefited both itself and Westshield. The petitioners 
argued that the acquisition of the contracts by Tunnelling was a breach of P’s 
fiduciary duty as a director of Westshield. 
At around the same time, P had also entered negotiations with the bank in order 
to acquire overall control of Westshield. This led to further disputes between the 
four sibling shareholders. As part of the dispute, P, as managing director, 
instructed the company’s IT consultant to curtail access by A and G to various 
emails. A and G subsequently attempted to bribe the IT consultant into restoring 
their access. When P discovered this, he dismissed them as employees of the 
company. The petitioners argued that the dismissals were unfair on the basis that 
the bribery allegation was a mere pretext for the dismissals. They alleged that the 
real reason for their dismissal was P’s wish to take control of the company. 
The petitioners made, in total, nine separate allegations of unfairly prejudicial 
conduct, some of which were not pursued. The two central elements of their case 
were that unfair prejudice to their interests had arisen from P’s actions in breach 
                                                            
2 AMT Coffee Limited, Re 2019 EW HC 46 Ch, per HHJ Paul Matthews at 119 
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of his fiduciary duties and from the unjustified dismissal of A and G and their 
exclusion from involvement in the business of the company.  
Discussion of quasi-partnership companies in Re Westshield 
A large section of the judgment in Re Westshield 3 was devoted to a consideration 
of the nexus or interface between ‘quasi-partnership companies’ and the 
circumstances where equitable considerations arise.4  
After setting out the facts and the issues that he would have to decide, HH Judge 
Eyre QC, began his judgment by considering the approach that he should take. 
Noting that counsel had agreed that Hawkes v Cuddy sets outs the three elements 
which a section 994 petition must establish,5 he then referred to Lord Hoffman’s 
well-known dicta to the effect that conduct in accordance with the relevant 
company’s ‘rules’ is not normally unfair, but that there are some circumstances 
where ‘equitable considerations’ make it otherwise.6  
The judge then asked himself, rhetorically: ”What are the circumstances in which 
those considerations come into play?” and answered his own question by stating 
that such circumstances are ‘akin’ to the circumstances in which a company can 
be wound up on just and equitable grounds – and ‘are commonly referred to as 
being those where the company is a quasi-partnership’. 
The term ‘quasi-partnership’ has been used repeatedly in ‘unfair prejudice’ cases7 
following its appearance in Lord Wilberforce’s seminal judgment in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd 8. While recognizing that the term may be convenient, 
HH Judge Eyre QC also described it as ‘potentially misleading shorthand’. He 
reiterated the view of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, that while ‘quasi-
partnership’ may be a ‘convenient label’ for the situations when equitable 
considerations will arise, it is not a definition of those circumstances and: 
“should not be allowed to subvert the underlying question: whether a petitioner 
can pinpoint matters giving rise to an equitable consideration which makes it 
unfair for those conducting the affairs of the company to rely upon their strict legal 
powers." 9  
                                                            
3 Re Westshield Limited, [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) at 26-52 
4 A topic that was also considered earlier this year in a Company Law Newsletter 
editorial, see David Milman, “ The quasi-partnership and company law”, Co. L.N. 2019, 
414, 1-5 
5 Hawkes v Cuddy (No.2)[2007] EWHC 2999 (Ch, [2008] BCC 39. In short: conduct of 
the company’s affairs; prejudice to the interests of a member; that the prejudice is 
unfair. 
6 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092; [1999] at 1099A 
7 Before section 994, the relevant statutory provisions were section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 and section 75 of the Companies Act 1980. 
8 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] A.C. 360;[1972]5 WLUK 13 (HL) 
9 Re Yung Kee Holdings Ltd [2014] 2HKLRD 313 at [107]  
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He further noted, however, that he nevertheless had to bear in mind Lord 
Hoffmann's comment in O'Neill that this: 
 "…does not mean that there are no principles by which those circumstances may 
be identified. The way in which such equitable principles operate is tolerably well 
settled and… It would be wrong to abandon them in favour of some wholly 
indefinite notion of fairness." 
One weakness however in Lord Hoffman’s judgment in O’Neill, as others have 
recognised10, was his failure to be more specific in describing the relevant 
equitable principles and their operation in this context.  
What are the relevant principles? 
Although he did not explicitly set out the relevant equitable principles, Lord 
Hoffman referred repeatedly, in his discussion in O’Neill of the role of equity, to 
the relevance of ‘good faith‘. Thus, ‘using the [company’s] rules in a manner which 
equity would regard as contrary to good faith’ would be unfair;11 equity would 
traditionally restrain the exercise of strict legal rights if this would be contrary to 
good faith12; and equity would require that powers must be exercised in good 
faith. 13 
‘Good faith’ was raised in both Re AMT Coffee and in Re Westshield. In Re AMT 
Coffee, it was held that the directors had failed to consider ‘in good faith’ whether 
or not to declare dividends.14 In Re Westshield it was relevant to the question, 
which frequently arises in section 994 cases and was considered in O’Neill itself, 
of whether or not an ‘agreement’ or ‘understanding’ between members of the 
company was sufficient to provide the equitable considerations that would allow 
the court to intervene. 
It is clear that such agreements do not have to have ‘the degree of certainty which 
would be necessary for an agreement to be enforceable as contract’, but – here 
HH Judge Eyre QC cited Khoshkhou v Cooper & others15 - that there must be "a 
sufficient degree of agreement that it can be said that there has been a breach of 
good faith in departing from it".  
This, of course, leads ineluctably to the question, what are the requirements of 
good faith?  
 
                                                            
10 Robin Hollington, Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 8th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
at 7-36 (2) 
11 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092 at 1099 
12 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092 at 1098 
13 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092 at 1099 
14 See further below 




What does ‘good faith’ mean or require? 
A full discussion of the meaning of ‘good faith’ is beyond the scope of this article. 
The term has been described as “protean” in character16 (which is helpful to judges 
but is very unhelpful to lawyers seeking to advise their clients) and “it has been 
implied in some commentary that the search for its meaning is fruitless.”17 What 
is clear from a review of the UK authorities is that “There is no particular definition 
of 'good faith' in English law; it is in essence a 'principle of fair and open 
dealing…”18 
The position does not seem to be any clearer in either Australia or the USA. 
Authorities in all three jurisdictions make copious references to the familiar 
concepts of honesty, fidelity, loyalty, and ‘playing fair’. They also make numerous 
references to the absence of bad faith, the absence of intent to defraud or to seek 
unconscionable advantage, and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards.  
While these are all helpful indications of what ‘good faith’ requires, it is submitted 
that in the context of deciding whether or not, for the purposes of section 994, an 
informal agreement or understanding is enforceable, they do not provide anything 
approaching ‘the degree of precision’, which HH Judge Eyre QC stated is required.  
Possibly, the most helpful statement in relation to the specific question of 
enforceable agreements for the purposes of  section 994 comes from the United 
States (Second) Restatement of the Law of Contracts : 
“Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to 
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the 
other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 
“bad faith” because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness.” (Emphasis added) 
But, although it is helpful, this statement is extremely short of pertinent detail. 
Application of the law relating to quasi-partnerships and equitable 
considerations in  Re Westshield 
After considering the interface between quasi-partnerships and equitable 
considerations, HH Judge Eyre QC had to decide whether or not equitable 
considerations justifying restraint and ‘interference’ etc. applied in this particular 
case.19 He concluded that they did. 
                                                            
16 Secretary, Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs v 
Prince (1997) 152 ALR 127  per Finn J at 130 
17 LexisNavigator, citing EA Farnsworth, “Good Faith in Contract Performance”, Beatson 
and Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Clarendon Press Oxford 
(1995) at 157 n 13, http://www.lexisnexis.com [Accessed June 5 2019]  
18 LexisNavigator, http://www.lexisnexis.com [Accessed June 5 2019] 
19 Re Westshield Limited, [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) at 60 
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His conclusion was expressed to be on the basis that the company was ‘regarded 
…as a family business’ and there were a number of indications of a ‘family 
arrangement’ or ‘family understanding’ governing the parties’ involvement in the 
company. The conduct of the parties had indicated that “the affairs of the 
Company were treated …not just [as] a matter of arm's length commercial 
agreement” and “the three brothers [were] approaching the matter as members 
of a family team rather than being bound solely by their commercial and legal 
relations.”20  
Presumably, HH Judge Eyre QC must have felt that a departure from these family 
arrangements would have constituted a breach of good faith, but there is no 
reference to any matter in the case that specifically constituted such a breach. 
The judge makes it clear that if the petitioners A and G had been removed without 
due cause, that  would have been contrary to the ‘family understanding’, but that 
was not the case here. 
Many, possibly a majority, of cases where a s 994 petition has been lodged will 
involve ‘family companies’ which will almost inevitably have entailed some family 
‘arrangement’ or ‘understanding’. How does a shareholder (or their legal adviser) 
know whether or not such arrangements and understandings will allow equity to 
intervene?  
Ultimately it will be for a judge to decide, having looked at ‘the overall picture’, 
whether or not a breach of such understandings or arrangements will constitute a 
breach of good faith. It seems quite likely that, without more precise guidance on 
the requirements of ‘good faith’, one judge’s interpretation of the relevant facts 
may often differ from another’s, as indeed occurred in O’Neill itself.21   
In the event, perhaps somewhat ironically, unfair prejudice in the case could be 
demonstrated without any recourse to equitable considerations. In acquiring 
contracts on behalf of Tunnelling, P had been in breach of his fiduciary duty, which 
"will generally indicate that unfair prejudice has occurred".22  
Can quasi-partnerships exist between only some of the members of a 
company? 
Before reaching a final decision in the case, HH Judge Eyre QC had to decide two 
points of principle. The first was whether or not a ‘quasi partnership’  - adopting 
the term as a ‘convenient label’ -  can arise where there are some members of the 
company who are not a party to the mutual understandings that exist between 
other members. The judge was faced with a choice between two contrasting 
                                                            
20 Re Westshield Limited, [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) at 61,63,64 
21 The three judges in the Court of Appeal all reached a different decision from the five 
judges in the House of Lords, although only one full judgment was delivered in each 
court, by Nourse LJ and Lord Hoffman respectively. O'Neill v Phillips [1997] 5 WLUK 32; 
[1998] B.C.C. 405; O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092 
22 Re Westshield Limited, [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) at 51, following Arden LJ in Re Tobian 
Properties Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [2013] BCLC 567 at [22]. 
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authorities23, although it was clear that neither judgment was binding because 
both the relevant judicial statements were not only qualified, but were also obiter 
dicta. 
In Re Yung Kee Holdings Ltd, 24 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal had held that: 
”… although the presence of third-party shareholders was a relevant and 
potentially a highly relevant factor when a court was determining whether 
equitable considerations existed such as to impose restraints on the exercise of 
the legal powers of those controlling the company it did not necessarily preclude 
a finding that such considerations were present.” (Emphasis added). 
By contrast, in the more recent case of Estera Trust Ltd v Singh,25 Fancourt J had 
said that he was “very doubtful” that the relevant equitable restraints could arise 
where there were shareholders who were not parties to the underlying 
understanding, "except perhaps in a case where the shareholders that are not 
party to the equitable considerations are either a very small minority or are closely 
connected to the quasi-partners … such that the established quasi-partnership 
character of the company does not change.”26 
In reaching his decision, Fancourt J had placed significant weight on the ‘character’ 
of the company which, if the court were to intervene, would normally be ‘akin to 
a partnership’. If some members of the company were not a party to the relevant 
‘mutual rights and understandings’, the company would not (normally) have the 
requisite partnership characteristics.  
In Re Westshield, HH Judge Eyre QC, while accepting that:  
“Where there is a close analogy between the character of the company and that 
of a partnership it is more likely than in other circumstances that there will be 
equitable considerations” 
observed that, nevertheless: “The partnership analogy is an analogy and is not 
the basis for the intervention by the court.” 
Fancourt J had also expressed concern about the potential adverse effects on other 
members of the company of allowing a quasi-partnership to exist in such 
circumstances. HH Judge Eyre QC agreed with the view of the Hong Kong court 
that “It will often be open to the court to craft relief … ‘without impinging upon 
the rights of the third-party shareholders’ or where that is not possible to say that 
those rights preclude relief in the particular circumstances.”  
                                                            
23 Re Yung Kee Holdings Ltd [2014] 2HKLRD 313; Estera Trust Ltd v Singh [2018] EWHC 
1715 
24  Re Yung Kee Holdings Ltd [2014] 2HKLRD 313 
25 Estera Trust Ltd v Singh [2018] EWHC 1715 
26 Estera Trust Ltd v Singh [2018] EWHC 1715 at  
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It is respectfully submitted that HH Judge Eyre QC was correct in preferring the 
approach in Re Yung Kee.27  
Must there be a causal connection between the relevant misconduct and 
the exclusion in order for exclusion from a quasi-partnership to be unfair? 
In Re Westshield, as in many other ‘quasi-partnership’ cases, one of the 
complaints of unfairness related to the exclusion of a ‘quasi-partner’ from the 
management of the company. This led to the second substantive point on which 
the judge ruled. 
It is settled law that in deciding whether or not unfair prejudice has occurred, the 
conduct of the petitioner may be taken into account.28  Placing weight on the word 
‘response’ used by Patten J in Grace v Biagioli 29, counsel for the respondent in Re 
Westshield argued that, for a person’s conduct to be relevant to the question of 
whether or not their exclusion was unfair, there had to have been ‘some ‘causal 
connection’ between the conduct and the exclusion. 
This argument was firmly rejected. Not only, said the judge, would it be a 
misinterpretation of Grace v Biagioli, but it would also be wrong in principle. Since 
unfairness is determined objectively (i.e. not on the basis of the perceptions of 
the partied involved), all the circumstances known to the court must be taken into 
account, even if they were not known at the time of the exclusion. (Emphasis 
added). 
It is respectfully submitted that this must be correct. As the judge continued: “It 
would be perverse if the court were permitted and required to look to all the 
circumstances of the case in order to decide whether the relevant equitable 
considerations are present but required to look only to some of the circumstances 
in order to decide whether a particular action was unfair and so precluded by those 
considerations.”30     
Delay, Knowledge, Consent and Acquiescence  
These ‘inter-related concepts’31 are often relevant to s 994 petitions. There is no 
statutory limitation period applicable to unfair prejudice petitions but delay and 
acquiescence are ‘as relevant as misconduct [on the part of the petitioner] in the 
                                                            
27 Professor Milman’s comments in a recent Company Law Newsletter editorial support 
this approach. David Milman,“The quasi-partnership and company law”, Co. L.N. 2019, 
414, 1-5  
28 Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1986] Ch. 211  [1985] 3 W.L.R. 474,  (1985) 1 
B.C.C. 99394 
29 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222; [2005] 11 WLUK 179; [2006] B.C.C. 85 
30 Re Westshield Limited, [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) at 49 
31 To borrow the term used by HHJ Paul Matthews, AMT Coffee Limited, Re [2019] EWHC 
46 (Ch) at 149  
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context of the issues of unfairness … of … treatment … and the appropriate 
remedy.”32  
Both cases specifically considered ‘acquiescence’ and its effect. In Re Westshield, 
the matter was covered very succinctly, whereas in Re AMT Coffee, HHJ Paul 
Matthews devoted a sizeable section of his judgment to a description and analysis 
of the relevant law.33  
Having concluded, in Re Westshield, that one (only) of the petitioners’ complaints 
had been shown to be unfairly prejudicial conduct, HH Judge Eyre QC had to 
consider whether acquiescence should preclude relief. He held that it did. He found 
that the petitioners “were prepared to allow matters to continue without complaint 
and delayed in taking action even after … they learnt of the possibility of legal 
redress ....” They had done so “either because they did not in reality regard [the 
respondent’s] behaviour as having been inappropriate or because they were 
content for the Company to continue to derive the benefits which flowed to it from 
the arrangement notwithstanding that there were also benefits for [the 
respondent].” It was only when the petitioners had subsequently been dismissed 
from their employment with the company (which the judge had held had been 
justified) that the proceedings had been ‘triggered’.  
In Re AMT Coffee the respondent argued that there were three ways in which 
consent and acquiescence had occurred. Firstly, the arrangements in relation to 
remuneration and dividend policy etc. that the petitioners complained of, had been 
agreed to by the older brother, (the first petitioner’s deceased husband) before 
his death.  
HHJ Paul Matthews referred, apparently with approval, to in Re KR Hardy Estates 
Ltd 34,  where the deputy judge, Martin Mann QC, had said: “Obviously, prejudice 
which directly or indirectly arises because of a course of conduct to which a 
member or class of members of a company has consented is by definition not 
relevantly unfair and cannot be relied on.”  
It was argued that, here, the estate of the deceased would have to give notice 
that the deceased’s previous consent had been withdrawn before any action 
formerly carried on with his consent would become unfair. 
This argument was - almost summarily - rejected. It was not right to treat consent 
given before death ‘as though it applied in perpetuity thereafter unless positively 
withdrawn.’ Furthermore, the actions complained of were matters that ‘arise again 
and again in the life of [a company]’; consent on one occasion does not constitute 
                                                            
32 Robin Hollington, Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 8th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
at 7-205 
33 AMT Coffee Limited, Re [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) at 149 - 177 
34 Re KR Hardy Estates Ltd [2016] BCC 367 
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consent on all other occasions. The death ‘had changed everything’ and the 
presence or absence of any withdrawal of consent was irrelevant. 
The respondent’s second argument in relation to consent revolved around the role 
of executors, their ability to bind each other and the capacity in which they act, 
when they are also directors and shareholders of the relevant company. This 
argument, the details of which are beyond the scope of this article, was also 
rejected by the judge. 
The third argument was that the petitioner, not only as executor, but also in her 
personal capacity as beneficiary of the estate, had consented and acquiesced in 
the arrangements.35 HHJ Paul Matthews set out five separate meanings of 
‘acquiescence’, as follows:  
1. “…mere failure to speak out or complain, unaccompanied by anything else.” 
This, he said, would not usually be legally significant.  
2. “… delay without more.” This, he said, would generally be significant only when 
the delay exceeds appropriate limitation periods.  
3. “…a kind of waiver or election between two inconsistent courses of action (for 
example, so as to waive the forfeiture of a lease whose terms have been 
breached). If there is such a waiver or election, the party concerned will not be 
able subsequently to change his or her mind and opt for the inconsistent course 
of action.”   
4. “…words or (more likely) conduct from which it may be inferred that a person 
has positively assented to a particular situation.” This, he said, is legally significant 
whenever informal consent is a relevant element.  
5. “… a failure to complain of an infringement of rights and reliance by the infringer 
on that failure to his or her detriment. This last case is a form of equitable estoppel, 
based upon a duty in equity to speak.” 
In Re AMT Coffee HHJ Paul Matthews held that only the final two meanings were 
relevant. The respondents were claiming: 
                                                            
35  Some linguistic authorities draw a distinction between acquiesce ‘in’ and acquiesce ‘to’. 
See, for example, Termium Plus, the official linguistic data bank of the Canadian 
Government, states that ‘acquiesce in’ indicates passive agreement with something, 
whereas ‘acquiesce to’ means to submit voluntarily to a thing, situation or condition. 
Although this nice distinction is relevant in the context of section 994 petitions, it may be 
asking too much of judges to expect them to be consistent in their usage of the appropriate 
preposition. Nevertheless, they presumably ought to, and no doubt will, take into account 
the passivity or otherwise of a petitioner’s acquiescence.  
https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2guides/guides/wrtps/index-





“….either that somehow, she [the petitioner] actually agreed to what was done 
(the fourth sense of the word), or alternatively that by failing to complain she has 
represented her agreement (even if she did not actually agree) to it, and the 
respondents have relied upon that representation to their detriment, thus making 
it unconscionable for her now to deny it (the fifth sense of the word).” He then 
went on to hold that neither of these had occurred. 
A number of points on consent and acquiescence arise from the two cases. 
Actual agreement 
In this context, actual agreement need not be express but can be inferred from 
words or conduct. This follows the standard approach in contract law. 
The effect of consent 
The statement in Re KR Hardy Estates that “prejudice which … arises because of 
a course of conduct to which a member… has consented is by definition not 
relevantly unfair…” presents the question of consent as a binary matter. Either 
consent has been given or it has not. This follows the approach in criminal law.  
It may have been intended to be implicit in the statement in Re KR Hardy Estates 
that for ’consent’ to be so decisive, it must be clear, complete and unqualified 
consent. If this is not the case, however, it is submitted that the statement in Re 
KR Hardy Estates may be too sweeping a proposition. It is difficult to see why, for 
the purpose of determining unfairness under s 994, there should not be scope for 
argument that the circumstances in which consent has been given and the nature 
and the degree of the consent may affect the question of unfairness.  
Is detrimental reliance essential for acquiescence? 
On the surface, the two cases appear to take a different view as to whether or not 
any ‘detriment’ is required to have been suffered by the respondent, if relief is to 
be denied because of ‘acquiescence’. It is notable, given HHJ Paul Matthews’ 
comments in Re AMT Coffee, that there is no mention in Re Westshield of any 
reliance by the respondent on the petitioners’ failure to complain earlier and no 
mention of any detriment being suffered by the respondent as a result of any such 
reliance. 
In reaching his decision HHJ Paul Matthews referred to the House of Lords’ decision 
in Fisher v Brooker36 where Lord Neuberger had stated “at least in a case such as 
this, I am not convinced that acquiescence adds anything to estoppel and laches.”  
In relation to estoppel, Lord Neuberger then cited Gillett v Holt which stated that 
the ‘overwhelming weight of authority shows that detriment is required’, although, 
                                                            
36 Fisher v Brooker [2009] 1 WLR 1764 
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this was subject to the important caveat that ‘the requirement must be 
approached as part of a broad inquiry’ into unconscionability.”37  
In the context of section 994, do Lord Neuberger’s comments apply to 
acquiescence in the same way that they apply to estoppel? It is noted that his 
equation of the two concepts was qualified by ‘in a case such as this’. If the two 
concepts are to be treated in the same way, is detrimental reliance an essential 
requirement for acquiescence or, is it, although highly relevant, still subject to the 
judge’s ‘broader’ view on the question of unconscionability?  
The latter view would make it easier to reconcile the decisions on this point in Re 
AMT Coffee and Re Westshield but, as with the question of ‘good faith’, it would, 
in theory at least, lead to greater uncertainty for prospective litigants and make it 
more difficult for parties to make informed decisions on settlements that are 
intended to avoid litigation. It would be helpful to have further judicial guidance 
on this point. 
Excessive remuneration 
In Re AMT Coffee,38 the directors’ pay had not been properly authorised in 
accordance with the company’s constitution. Similar situations had arisen in Re A 
Company (No 004415 of 1996)39 and Irvine v Irvine40. 
In Re A Company, Scott VC stated the need, in such a situation, for the directors 
to justify their remuneration, by ‘objective commercial criteria’, as being ‘within 
the bracket that executives carrying the sort of responsibility and discharging the 
sort of duties that they were carrying and discharging would expect to receive…’. 
(Emphasis added) 
This was followed by Blackburne J in Irvine v Irvine, who stated that Scott VC’s 
test required the court to determine whether or not the remuneration was 
‘appropriate in amount’. Arden LJ, as she then was, subsequently endorsed this 
approach, in Re Tobian.41  
What are the ‘objective commercial criteria’ that need to be taken into account?  
in Re AMT Coffee three experts provided evidence. One of the few substantive 
points on which they agreed was that ‘benchmarking’ was appropriate:  
“This is the process by which the relevant function or functions within the company 
are identified and then the appropriate benchmark companies are found, and 
relevant information about remuneration is extracted.”42  
                                                            
37 Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210, 232D 
38 AMT Coffee Ltd, Re [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch)  
39 Company (No.004415 of 1996), Re [1997] 1 WLUK 249  
40 Irvine v Irvine [2006] EWHC 583 (Ch); [2006] 3 WLUK 652   
41 Re Tobian, also known as Maidment v Attwood, [2012] EWCA Civ 998 at 36  
42 AMT Coffee Ltd, Re [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) at 92 
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There were however many disputes between the experts as to which companies 
were ‘the appropriate comparators’ and whether the data used was reliable. Other 
criteria that were referred to included the company’s annual turnover and profit 
(or loss), market capitalization, remuneration surveys, and evidence of job offers 
made to the directors. 
Unsurprisingly, the three experts took very ‘different approaches’ to the question 
of remuneration. It is not stated explicitly that each expert’s approach  produced 
an outcome that was more favourable to the party on whose behalf it was 
submitted as evidence, but it seems clear that this was the case. In his review of 
the evidence the judge found flaws in the methodology of all three experts and 
concluded that none of it was admissible.43  
Expert evidence is not essential to the determination of whether or not 
remuneration is excessive.44  As HHJ Paul Matthews put it “… you do not need to 
be a carpenter to know when someone has made a table badly”.45  He commented 
that  the company’s approach to remuneration had been based “on anything but 
commercial factors” . He then considered a range of factors before concluding that 
the directors had received excessive remuneration. Three key factors were the 
executive or non-executive role of the directors, the company’s turnover and its 
profitability. The judge acknowledged that turnover and profitability were ‘only 
factors’ in the decision, but they were ‘rough indicators’ of the degree of 
responsibility taken by the directors and in some cases demonstrated that the 
remuneration was ‘plainly excessive’.   
The discussion in Re AMT Coffee illustrates that in cases where ‘excessive 
remuneration’ is an issue, there will almost always be an extensive list of factors 
that could be classified as ‘objective commercial criteria’. It will almost always be 
possible to raise critical questions and doubts about the data selected by experts 
and their methodology. Judges will have an extremely wide discretion as to the 
criteria that they select either to subject to criticism or to treat as important. 
As with the question of ‘good faith’, it is submitted that while the criteria used in 
reaching a judgment on the question of ‘excessive remuneration’ may be 
‘objective’, there is little scope for confidence that any two judges, faced with the 
same evidence and set of facts, will reach the same decision.  
 
                                                            
43 AMT Coffee Ltd, Re [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) at 111 
44 See Re Tobian, also known as Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 at 48.  No 
expert evidence had been adduced but Arden LJ held that ‘ There were ample grounds 
on which the judge could reach the conclusion that Mr Attwood’s remuneration was out 
of the norm for this particular company, and in that sense (if no other) that the 
remuneration was excessive.’   
45 AMT Coffee Limited, Re 2019 EW HC 46 Ch, Re Westshield Limited, [2019] EWHC 115 
(Ch) at 123 
14 
 
The need to consider payment of dividends 
The decision in Re AMT Coffee confirms the view expressed in leading practitioners’ 
texts that a failure by the directors to make a decision in good faith on whether to 
declare (strictly, usually to recommend) the payment of dividends can amount to 
unfairly prejudicial conduct.46 In this case, the decision was bolstered by the fact 
that the company had sufficient reserves, had paid out large bonuses to directors 
and had lent large sums of money to the directors via loan accounts.  
HHJ Paul Matthews commented that “… the non-payment of dividends is to a 
considerable extent the obverse of the remuneration question. The more that 
profits are lawfully paid out to directors and others in remuneration, the less there 
is available to be paid out to shareholders by way of dividend. Where all the 
shareholders work in the business, this matters less ….” 
Should the burden of proof shift? 
Clearly there may be situations where the failure to consider in good faith whether 
or not to declare dividends will not be unfairly prejudicial; factors of the kind 
referred to by the judge are bound to be relevant and should be taken into 
account. Would it be beneficial for the courts to go further than they have done 
previously, however, and state that a failure by the directors to consider in good 
faith whether or not to declare a dividend is, in itself, prima facie, unfairly 
prejudicial? This would reflect the underlying view that “shareholders have a prima 
facie right to participate in the profits made by a company which are available for 
distribution”47. It might also have a small salutary effect of the sort that Arden LJ 
referred to in Re Tobian when she said that ” the unfair prejudice remedy [is] 
important as a means of encouraging proper corporate behaviour in the 
management of smaller companies…” 48 
Discounts on the purchase of minority holdings  
Both cases considered whether or not a discount should be applied in the valuation 
of a minority stake when a share purchase had been ordered following a successful 
petition. In Re Westshield, HH Judge Eyre QC was not required to decide the 
question, - having declined to grant the petitioners relief - but he had received 
submissions on the matter so set out the conclusion that he would have reached. 
He endorsed the approach set out in Re Lloyds Autobody Ringway Ltd.49 Thus, 
                                                            
46 See Robin Hollington, Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 8th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 
2016) at 7-166; Victor Joffe QC, David Drake, Giles Richardson, Daniel Lightman QC, 
and Timothy Collingwood, Minority Shareholders, Law, Practice, and Procedure, 6th edn 
(OUP 2018) at 6.199 
47 Robin Hollington, Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 8th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
at 7-166, making reference to Re a Company (No 00370 of 1987), ex p Glossop [1988] 
1 WLR 1068, 1076 C-F 
48 Re Tobian, also known as Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 
49 Re Lloyds Autobody Ringway Ltd [2018] EWHC 2336 (Ch) per HH Judge Hodge QC at 
[113 - 114] 
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even though there had been a family ‘understanding’ that would allow equity to 
intervene in the respondent’s exercise of his strict legal powers, the dismissal of 
the two petitioners A and G  had been justified, and any buying out order of the 
shares would therefore have been on a fully discounted basis. 
In Re AMT Coffee, where a buyout was ordered, the answer to the question had a 
practical as well as a theoretical consequence. HHJ Paul Matthews analysed it in 
some detail.50  Firstly, he had to decide whether the company should be treated 
as a quasi-partnership. If so, that led to two questions: 
 Did it necessarily mean that the shares must be valued on a non-discounted 
basis? 
 Could a non-discounted order be made, even if the company was not a 
quasi-partnership? 
In answering these questions he had to consider two differing streams of 
authority. In Strahan v Wilcock51 and Irvine v Irvine (No 2)52 the judges had 
indicated, respectively, that it would be “difficult to conceive of circumstances in 
which a non-discounted basis of valuation would be appropriate …where there was 
unfair prejudice … but [a quasi-partnership] relationship did not exist” and that 
“Short of a quasi partnership or some other exceptional circumstance” any 
valuation should be on a discounted basis. 
By contrast, in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd 53 Oliver LJ had emphasized the wide 
discretion of the court to do what is fair in all the circumstances.54 This approach 
had been supported and followed in the more recent cases of Re Sunrise Radio 
Ltd 55 [2010] 1 BCLC 367 and Re Blue Index Ltd.56 The question had been 
considered most recently in Estera Trust v Singh. 57 
In Estera Fancourt J said that where there was a ‘true’ quasi-partnership, there 
was a presumption in favour of non-discounted order. If there was no quasi-
partnership there was no such presumption but a non-discounted order could 
nevertheless be made. He had also emphasized judicial discretion in setting a ‘fair 
price’.  In particular, market value was not ‘the only alternative in cases where a 
non-discounted valuation is inappropriate.’  
While emphasizing that he did not have to express a concluded view on this 
‘controversy’, HHJ Paul Matthews seemed to prefer the Estera approach: “… it is 
at least clear that the weight of authority is that there is a discretion to be 
                                                            
50 Re AMT Coffee Limited 2019 EW HC 46 Ch at 194 - 216 
51 Strahan v Wilcock [2006] 2 BCLC 555   
52 Irvine v Irvine (No 2) [2007] 1 BCLC 445 
53 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1986] Ch 658 
54 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1986] Ch 658, at 669DE 
55 Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2010] 1 BCLC 367 
56 Re Blue Index Ltd [2014] EWHC 2680 (Ch) 




exercised.”  It is respectfully submitted that this is correct and the short answer 
to the two questions stated above is ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ respectively.  
The factors that HHJ Paul Matthews took into account in exercising the discretion 
included: 
 whether or not the circumstances would have justified an order for just and 
equitable winding up (where a discount would not normally be applied); 
 
 whether the petitioner could fairly be regarded as a ‘willing seller’ (which 
will not usually be the case); 
 
 the extent, if any, by which the wrongdoers would benefit from their unfair 
conduct if a discount were applied. This would occur if, for example, the 
acquisition of the new shares would lead to a shareholding crossing a 
significant voting threshold, such as 50% of the share capital;  
 
 the fact that a sale to a third party had been hindered by the behaviour of 
the respondents. 
Corporate opportunities 
As with decisions on section 994, the law relating to breach of fiduciary duty by 
directors who take advantage of corporate opportunities is highly fact sensitive. 
The application of the principles of honesty, loyalty, good faith and avoiding 
conflict of interest that bind directors requires “care and sensitivity both to the 
facts and to other principles, such as that of personal freedom to compete…”58 
One factor that will be taken into account is whether or not the director came 
across the opportunity in their capacity as a director. In Re Westshield the 
respondent, P, had learnt of the opportunity while ‘having a pre-Christmas drink 
at a railway public house’ and argued that, at the time, he was not acting in his 
capacity as a director. HH Judge Eyre QC described this as ‘wholly artificial’ and 
took a robust approach to the issue. Firstly, he said, ‘it was only because of his 
position in the company that others would know that he might be interested in 
such information…’ Secondly, it was the respondent’s ability to cause the company 
to complete those contracts which made the [opportunity] worthwhile. The 
opportunity which came to P could not “be seen separately from that ability to 
cause the Company to engage in those activities and so is to be seen as coming 
to him by reason of his position in the Company.”  
Directors’ rights  
Another area of company law where it would be helpful to have much greater 
clarity relates to the precise rights of individual directors. In Re Westshield the 
                                                            
58 Foster Bryant Surveying Ltd v Bryant [2007] EWCA Civ 200, [2007] B.C.C. 804 per Rix 
LJ at 76  
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petitioners had been dismissed from their employment with the company because 
of misconduct which included trying to access emails which P, the respondent and 
managing director did not wish them to see. The petitioners argued that, as 
directors, they were entitled to ‘full access to all the affairs of the company’.  HH 
Judge Eyre QC rejected this argument: “a director … is entitled to the information 
necessary to enable him or her properly to undertake the duties of a director” and 
“… [the] board is entitled to full information about every aspect of a company's 
affairs.” This did not mean however “a director is simply by virtue of his position 
as director entitled to see all e-mails or other documents generated in the course 
of the company's business.” There could, on the other hand, be “no confidentiality 
from the board of a company acting as the board ....” 
Conclusion 
The careful, detailed and extensive judgments in these two recent cases provide 
much helpful information that is of value to academics and practitioners. Clear 
answers have been given in relation to two specific questions regarding ‘quasi-
partnership companies’. Further guidance has been given on the subject of 
acquiescence, although it would be useful if a future judgment could clearly 
confirm the position as regards the need for detrimental reliance. 
On the other hand, the two judgments also seem to confirm that predicting the 
decision of a court, when it has to consider whether an informal agreement 
between the parties is binding - which will hinge on the question of ‘good faith’ - 
is likely to remain extremely difficult. The same will apply to decisions on whether 
or not directors’ remuneration has been excessive, In petitions where these are 
relevant questions, this will compound the inherently high risk of litigation. This in 
turn is likely to have two contrasting practical consequences. Any increase in the 
risk of litigation will presumably often make parties more inclined to try to settle 
a dispute out of court, but the additional uncertainty of the negotiating strengths 
of the parties may make such settlements more difficult to reach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
